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DIA review completed.

ARMY review completed

State Dept. review completed

USAF review completed.

JCS review completed.

NAVY review completed.

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10 July 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR : The Intelligence Advisory Committee
The Chairmen, IAC Subcommittees

SUBJECT : Annual Report to the NSC on the Status
of the Foreign Intelligence Program

REFERENCES : IAC-D-55/11 (Final), 18 August 1956
IAC-D-55/11, 22 June 1956 (with Attachment)

1. We have been advised informally that, as in the past few years, the intelligence community will be required to submit to the NSC a coordinated report on the status of the foreign intelligence program for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1957. It is our understanding also that the deadline for submission of this report will be 15 August.

2. As far as we have been able to determine, it is expected that the substantive content of the report will be roughly analogous to the basic paper submitted last year. However, there probably will be no similar requirement for a 3-year fiscal projection or a progress report on action taken with respect to the recommendations of the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee.

3. If, as it appears, the 15 August deadline is firm, this report will have to be prepared and coordinated on a very tight schedule. It is for this reason that we are alerting agencies and subcommittees to this anticipated requirement in advance of the receipt of any formal notification from the NSC. Pending receipt of the formal request from the NSC it is therefore hoped that the agencies and subcommittees will begin preparation of contributions along the lines of those submitted last year, taking into account major developments in their respective fields during the past fiscal year. The over-all coordination process will, of course, be

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greatly facilitated if the contributions by the IAC subcommittees are coordinated through those committees prior to their submission to the IAC Secretariat.

4. As soon as the formal request from the NSC becomes available we shall circulate it and schedule a preliminary meeting to discuss the guidelines set forth in the communication and outline more precisely the procedures to be followed in preparing and coordinating this report.



JOHN HEIRES
Secretary

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30 August 1957

3 Sept 57

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Annual Report to the NSC on the Status of the Foreign Intelligence program

1. Pursuant to Mr. Lay's direction, this report follows the general lines of last year's report and includes an annex which cross-references the activities discussed to relevant NSCID's. We were not required to furnish a three-year fiscal projection or a progress report on action taken with respect to recommendations of the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Board, such as appeared in Annexes to last year's paper.
2. With respect to substantive content, the summary section on warning (pp. i-ii) except for the first and last paragraph, is expressed in the language of the latest warning estimate (NIE 11-3-57). The second summary paragraph under "Evaluation and Estimates" (pp. iii-iv) is designed to highlight the broader aspects of our estimative problem with respect to the Soviet Bloc rather than to summarize a specific portion of the text. In the basic text, paragraph 5 (p. 5) adds a new item on "crisis situation" review by the IAC. Elsewhere in the text those portions of the discussion which fall within the province of specific IAC subcommittees were, generally speaking, based on written contributions furnished by those subcommittees (e.g. Watch, JAEIC, SEC, EIC, GMIC, etc.) The Clandestine Collection section (p. 50a et seq.) is virtually identical with the draft you personally approved. However, the representatives believed it desirable to add the last sentence in paragraph 16a (p. 50a) to balance the presentation.
3. We are not aware of any potential dissents to this paper, except for a possible question which might be raised by State. At the clean-up session, the State representative tabled for the first time a paragraph which characterized the activities of the intelligence community with respect to the Hungarian and Suez crises. (A copy of State's proposed paragraph is attached.) As we understood it, Mr. Cumming had not seen or approved the draft. None of the other representatives believed that this language should be included, and it was further felt that any decision to add such material should be made, if at all, by the IAC itself. At this time we are

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uncertain whether Mr. Cumming will choose to raise this question. The State representative tends to doubt it, but noted that he understood Mr. Cumming was planning to contact Mr. Armstrong on the matter. Under these circumstances, we obtained, and are adding to your briefing book only, copies of certain background papers which you might find useful to refresh your recollection in the event Mr. Cumming mentions the issue.

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JOHN HEIRES
Secretary, IAC



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


MEMORANDUM FOR : The Executive Secretary
National Security Council

SUBJECT : Report on the Status of the Foreign
Intelligence Program as of 30 June 1957

1. The attached report has been prepared pursuant to Presidential directive as forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence by the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, by memorandum dated 16 July 1957. Primary reference has been made to national security policy objectives applicable to the intelligence community, particularly as set forth in NSC 5707/8.

2. The report, as requested, follows the general lines of Part 7 of NSC 5611. The attached Annex A cross-references the activities discussed to relevant National Security Council Intelligence Directives.

3. The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this report, including Annex A, on 3 September 1957.


C. P. CABELL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Acting Director

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ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE
STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
(as of 30 June 1957)

Submitted by
Intelligence Advisory Committee

September 1957

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ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE
STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

SUMMARY

Evaluation of U. S. Capabilities to Provide

Warning of Attack

The difficulties for intelligence in giving warning prior to the launching of a Soviet attack against the U. S. or U. S. forces are increasing. This is true particularly because the USSR's growing strength in advanced weapons--modern jet aircraft, guided missiles, submarines, and nuclear bombs and warheads--is increasing from year to year Soviet capabilities for large-scale surprise attack.

At present, as a rough estimate, a force up to 300 long-range aircraft could probably be launched concurrently without producing indications permitting intelligence to give warning of possible attack. Generally speaking, the probability of obtaining warning indications would increase as the numbers of aircraft increased. There is no basis for judging at what point the chances of receiving warning indications would be about even; it is believed, however, that if the number of aircraft launched concurrently was as great as about 800, the chances of their producing warning indications would be considerably greater than even. If received, these indications would probably permit intelligence to warn of a possible attack some 4-8 hours before attacking aircraft could reach radar warning lines.

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Warning of possible attack in Western Europe by Soviet forces stationed in Germany might range from a few hours to a week,

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If a Soviet attack was preceded by full mobilization of the USSR's military establishment, warning of possible attack could probably be given a few weeks in advance. Intelligence might during the course of mobilization be able to forecast the approximate date at which military preparations would be complete, but it would always be possible for the USSR to attack with its ready forces at an earlier date.

Warning of attack by clandestine means would depend primarily on the possibility that some part of the Soviet clandestine plan had miscarried or on chance discovery. Thus, there could be no assurance that intelligence would be able to warn of such forms of attack.

Once surface-to-surface guided missiles were positioned for launching, advance warning of their use would be unlikely.

With respect to the warning problem, the Intelligence Advisory Committee has undertaken a survey of sources of warning information to determine how fully and promptly present and potential collection methods, sources, and transmission channels can provide information essential to advance warning of Sino-Soviet Bloc hostile action.

Evaluation and Estimates

A. Soviet Bloc

With respect to developments in the Soviet Bloc, the struggle for dominance within the Soviet leadership since Stalin's death resulted in an increasing exposure to intelligence of the inner workings of the regime and of the issues which divide the leadership. The public justifications made by the victorious factions in the successive crises since 1953 have enabled intelligence to check its

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information and thus to formulate its views on a sounder footing of evidence. This does not mean that we are in a very much better position to predict particular developments in the USSR, such as the rise or fall of individual personalities, but it does mean that we can delimit more confidently the range of possible developments on the Soviet internal scene. Similarly, the relatively greater openness of discussion in the USSR and the greater accessibility of Soviet personalities at all levels have given us a better insight into the motivations and tactics of Soviet foreign policy. However, these gains are more significant for short-term estimates than for long-term ones. The Soviet leadership, for example, seems likely to be presented with difficult choices of policy. Already it must reconsider its economic policies at a time when military costs and the claims of consumption are pressing ever harder on the traditional priority given to investment to sustain a high rate of economic growth. It must reconsider the shape of its military programs during a period of revolutionary change in weapons. Relations with the restive Satellites and Communist China have evidently called for redefinition. There is evidence that the regime has increasing difficulty in retaining the loyalty of students and intellectuals and needs to provide more nourishing ideological fare. Such fundamental problems affecting future developments in the USSR are extremely complex, slow-moving in their resolution, and do not lend themselves readily to reliable estimating on the basis of the kinds of evidence ordinarily available to intelligence.

In the field of military intelligence, valuable additional information was obtained on the Soviet military establishment, including data on those elements posing the most direct threat to U. S. security interests. Military intelligence information on the Sino-Soviet Bloc is adequate to support broad assessments of the current capabilities of the armed forces of those countries and to discern general trends in their development.

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well as thorough exploitation of open source materials [redacted] have resulted in gains in certain categories of military information despite Bloc security measures. [redacted]

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Gains in economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc have resulted from a growing return on our effort in research and analysis over several years and from a continuing increase in published data within the Bloc, particularly the USSR. Serious deficiencies remain, however, particularly as related to the extent, cost, and economic burden of Bloc military programs. To reduce this deficiency indirect research techniques have been developed.

There has been continued improvement in scientific intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, both through research and through information gained from increased contacts with Soviet nationals. During the past year, significant information has been obtained on Soviet nuclear weapons testing, but there is inadequate information on Soviet production of fissionable materials and nuclear weapons. Although there has been a continued improvement in the quality of our guided missile intelligence information, it is still inadequate to meet our minimum intelligence requirements. Highest priority continues to be given to this problem, with special emphasis being placed on technical collection methods.

B. Non-Bloc Areas

The periodic preparation of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates on Non-Bloc areas, constituting a substantial proportion of all estimates published during the period, has been directed towards providing a meaningful measure of probable political, economic, and military developments bearing upon U.S. security interests. As a result of its continuing program of current intelligence research and analysis of political, economic, and military affairs throughout the world the IAC has also been able to

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provide advance intelligence support to policy-makers at all levels of the government regarding significant trends and events. Support in depth of both policy-making and policy-executing arms of the government has continued through the production of basic intelligence studies including the NIS series.

Collection

The list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives was again revised and continued to emphasize Sino-Soviet strategy, intentions or plans related to the initiation of hostilities. The highest priority was also assigned to Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack, defense against air (including missiles) attack, and the clandestine delivery of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against the U. S. or key U. S. overseas installations. There was intensive exploitation of new collection opportunities [redacted] more 25X1 open discussions in the USSR and Satellites, greater availability of certain types of Soviet Bloc publications, [redacted] 25X1 and the general stimulation to collection activities arising from the Middle Eastern and Eastern European crises. Intelligence gains also resulted from better technical collection techniques and from a general improvement of collection capabilities, both overt and clandestine.

Despite these gains, deficiencies continue to exist in many fields, particularly with respect to our collection activities directed against the Sino-Soviet Bloc. [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted] freer access to Bloc personalities or publications and a general improvement in existing collection and processing facilities show promise of reducing political and economic intelligence deficiencies. Further development of our technical collection techniques and expanded clandestine efforts will be necessary to reduce significantly critical deficiencies in the military and scientific and technical fields. In any event, factors such as security restrictions and rapidly advancing technology will continue to limit our ability to achieve a significant reduction in our most critical intelligence deficiencies by an early date.

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REPORT

A. Warning of Attack*

1. Evaluation of U. S. Capabilities

a. The difficulties for intelligence in giving warning prior to the launching of a Soviet attack against the U. S. or U. S. forces are increasing. This is particularly true because the USSR's growing strength in advanced weapons--modern jet aircraft, guided missiles, submarines, and nuclear bombs and warheads--is increasing from year to year Soviet capabilities for large-scale surprise attack.

b. At present, as a rough estimate, a force up to 300 long-range aircraft could probably be launched concurrently without producing indications permitting intelligence to give warning of possible attack. Generally speaking, the probability of obtaining warning indications would increase as the numbers of aircraft increased. There is no basis for judging at what point the chances of receiving warning indications would be about even; it is believed, however, that if the number of aircraft launched concurrently was as great as about 800, the chances of their producing warning indications would be considerably greater than even. If received, these indications would probably permit intelligence to warn of a possible attack some 4-8 hours before attacking aircraft could reach radar warning lines.

c. Warning of possible attack in Western Europe by Soviet forces stationed in Germany might range from a few hours to a week,

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* The most recent comprehensive review of this problem by the intelligence community appears in NIE 11-3-57, "Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US," approved by the IAC on 18 June 1957.

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d. If a Soviet attack was preceded by full mobilization of the USSR's military establishment, warning of possible attack could probably be given a few weeks in advance. Intelligence might during the course of mobilization be able to forecast the approximate date at which military preparations would be complete, but it would always be possible for the USSR to attack with its ready forces at an earlier date.

e. Warning of attack by clandestine means would depend primarily on the possibility that some part of the Soviet clandestine plan had miscarried or on chance discovery. Thus, there could be no assurance that intelligence would be able to warn of such forms of attack.

f. Once surface-to-surface guided missiles were positioned for launching advance warning of their use would be unlikely.

2. The Watch Committee of the IAC

a. The Watch Committee has continued its examination of intelligence information for indications of Soviet/Communist intentions to initiate hostilities

[REDACTED]

The critical developments of October-November 1956 confronted the Watch Committee with a major test of its alertness and ability to achieve prompt common evaluations as to Soviet intentions, particularly with reference to the employment of military force in critical situations. The National Indications Center (the 24-hour staff of the Watch Committee) has used the experience gained during the crisis period to refine further its lists of potential indicators of hostile Sino-Soviet Bloc intentions.

b. The Intelligence Advisory Committee has undertaken a survey of sources of warning information to determine how fully and promptly

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present and potential collection methods, sources, and transmission channels can provide information essential to advance warning of Sino-Soviet Bloc hostile action.

3. USAF Indications System

The Air Force has continued operation of an expanded worldwide Indications System keyed to the detection of the imminence of hostilities, especially air attack with nuclear weapons. Capabilities of the system to provide warning are being improved through sharpened collection requirements, better communication links, revised indicator lists and analytical techniques, and through continuing research and development. Indications centers serving the Air Defense Command, SAC, Alaskan Air Command, Pacific Air Forces, 5th Air Force, 13th Air Force and USAFE are tied in with the Headquarters USAF Indications Center by rapid communications for high priority transmission of indications intelligence. The USAF Indications Center maintains close liaison with the National Indications Center in Washington.

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5. "Crisis Situation" Review by IAC

Under a procedure initiated in the past year, the IAC at its weekly meetings regularly reviews as a body intelligence and information bearing on actual or potential "crisis situations" anywhere in the world. This has proved to be a valuable stimulant for the

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regular exchange of views, at the highest level in the intelligence community, on matters of both immediate and long-range intelligence interest. The new procedure has also assisted in scheduling estimates, and has provided a mechanism for inspiring suggestions and crystallizing the community viewpoint with respect to matters on which the Director of Intelligence may brief the National Security Council.

6. Taiwan Strait Coverage

The Ad Hoc Current Intelligence Group for the Taiwan Strait Problem, established by the IAC in March 1955 in response to the President's desire for coordinated intelligence coverage of this area, continues to meet regularly, at least once a month. Since early December 1956 its reports have been prepared on a monthly basis, except during June 1957 when two reports were issued because of unusual military activity in the area.

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B. Evaluation and Estimates

1. National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's)

a. Production of NIE's continued to be guided largely by the needs of the NSC and related bodies. Of the 57 NIE's published during the last year, 35 were related to specific NSC papers or policy actions.

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b. The IAC continued to provide estimates in support of the reports to the NSC on the "net evaluation" of the capabilities of the USSR to inflict direct injury on the continental U. S. The main estimates for the 1956 report, keyed to the focal period of mid-1959, were NIE 11-56, "Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US and Key Overseas Installations and Forces Through Mid-1959" and NIE 11-2-56, "The Soviet Atomic Energy Program." The 1956 report was also supported by NIE 11-4-56, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1961." Estimative support for the net evaluation to be submitted in late 1957 will include SNIE 11-6-57, "Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the Continental US in Mid-1960," NIE 11-5-57, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field," NIE 11-2-57, "The Soviet Atomic Energy Program" and NIE 11-3-57, "Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US."

c. The work of the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament was supported by NIE 100-6-57, "Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries--Likelihood and Consequences."

d. A substantial proportion of the NIE's and SNIE's were devoted principally to problems of the Non-Bloc world. A number of these were on emergency situations such as those in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

e. The post-mortem procedure on NIE's continues to be a valuable method of highlighting intelligence gaps and providing guidance for future intelligence collection. Pursuant to the recommendation of the post-mortem on NIE 11-5-57, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field," for example, the IAC established an "Ad Hoc Weapons Systems Study Committee." This Committee is studying methods for evaluating the comparative effectiveness of competing Soviet weapons systems in order to assist in the formulation of national estimates on Soviet military programs.

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2. National Intelligence Surveys (NIS)

a. During the year NIS production essentially fulfilled the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) annual production requirement, and brought the total of the NIS production thus far to over 3,700 sections. This represents more than 65 percent of the total world coverage, and on the JCS high priority areas coverage is now over 90 percent complete. Nearly one-third of the production effort during the year was directed towards maintenance revision of published NIS sections.

b. A major accomplishment this year has been the comprehensive revision of the NIS Standard Instructions, and the development of the NIS Reference Guide to provide for a better understanding and more effective use of the NIS among the growing body of NIS recipients. Other noteworthy activities during the year included the production of the NIS on the Arctic two years ahead of schedule, the attainment of world-wide NIS Gazetteer coverage on all foreign areas, and the development by the Defense agencies of formal NIS Control and Coordination Directives.

c. In summary, this has been a year of solid accomplishment, characterized by excellent interagency support and coordination, and reflecting a gradual improvement in collection guidance and acquisition, better administrative controls, and more efficient interagency procedures.

d. If present production capabilities are maintained the NIS program will meet the JCS annual requirement for the next three years. This would result in 85 percent to 90 percent coverage of world areas by 30 June 1960, and the revision of one-third of all published NIS under the maintenance program.

3. Military Intelligence

a. Military intelligence information on the Sino-Soviet Bloc is adequate to support broad assessments of the current capabilities of the Armed Forces of those countries and to discern general trends

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in their development. This information, however, remains inadequate in critical fields to provide a firm intelligence basis for U. S. military plans, operations, and research and development. Moreover, the rapidity of change in military technology is increasing our difficulties in collecting hard evidence to support future projections of Soviet military capabilities.

b. The quality and quantity of certain types of military intelligence information on the Sino-Soviet Bloc improved during the past year. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] However, deficiencies continued in categories such as order of battle on non-divisional units, strength level of units, and in information relating to the design, characteristics and production of both conventional and new-type weapons and equipment. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] we still lack specific information regarding new weapons systems and related techniques which the Soviets intend to introduce into their navy, especially their submarine arm. [REDACTED]

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Future projections of Soviet air capabilities continue to be hampered by the lack of detailed information on aviation research and development programs as well as on the performance characteristics of new weapons and equipment that may be introduced.

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
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
Order of battle data on the Chinese Communist Army continues to be relatively good although not quite at last year's level. However, intelligence on both this Army and the North Korean Army is inadequate to assure advance warning of impending military operations.

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
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
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f. Our efforts to overcome deficiencies in military intelligence continue to be severely restricted by the security measures imposed by other countries. The factors and conditions which have limited access to the most critical information continue to be studied in order to develop more successful collection resources, through both overt and clandestine means. However, it is not now possible to predict a significant alleviation of major deficiencies by an early date.

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4. Political Intelligence

a. Political intelligence continued to provide policy-makers throughout the government with both current and basic finished intelligence to assist in the assessment of foreign situations. For example, through newly developing procedures in support of the Operations Coordinating Board, political intelligence is being increasingly utilized in policy development and implementation.

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b. Political intelligence on the USSR and the Satellites has continued to show some improvement, principally due to factors such as revelations incident to factional struggles in the USSR, the appearance of opposition forces in the Satellites and the greater freedom of diplomatic and other forms of contact which have developed in the post-Stalin period. With respect to Communist China, political intelligence remains a major problem and is still highly inadequate for an assessment of Communist China's motives and possible future actions.

c. Political intelligence during the past year was characterized particularly by the unusual demands on resources generated by the Middle Eastern and Eastern European crises. More active Soviet participation in affairs of the Middle East and the expanding Soviet "economic offensive" have created continuing burdens. Despite these growing responsibilities, high-level governmental requests and essential requirements of the intelligence community for political intelligence have generally been met.

5. Economic Intelligence

a. Economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc has improved as a result of exploitation of the greater volume of economic data published by a number of Bloc countries during the year. This has permitted the filling of important gaps in intelligence, and has provided a firmer basis for estimates of future economic activity. For example, one important result has been a downward revision in estimates of the Soviet population and labor force available to carry out ambitious economic plans.

b. Serious deficiencies still remain, however, in the availability of information on some Bloc economic activities, particularly those related to military production and programs. This latter deficiency has led to the development of indirect research techniques for estimating the extent, cost, and economic burden of Bloc military programs. The economic estimates so obtained, while subject to a substantial margin of error, do provide an independent check on military estimates derived by conventional means. These economic

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estimates were helpful in arriving at estimates of the size and composition of the guided missile, air defense and heavy bomber weapons systems. Similar techniques are being applied to the economic analysis of the Soviet nuclear energy program.

c. An increasing volume of reports has been published on current economic developments in the Bloc, including special evaluations of developments in Poland and Hungary, and appraisals of the reorganization of the Soviet economy and its effect on economic capabilities. Economic intelligence has also provided support to the London disarmament negotiations, the Paris negotiations relating to controls on trade with Communist China, the Washington talks on US-Polish trade and assistance, [REDACTED]

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d. Interagency coordination of economic research through the Economic Intelligence Committee of the IAC has continued. Coordinated reports have been issued on Communist China's trade and transport, Sino-Soviet Bloc economic activities in underdeveloped areas, and other subjects. The current status of economic intelligence has been reviewed as a guide for programming by the individual agencies. The EIC prepared a revised statement of "Priority National Economic Intelligence Objectives" for guidance in economic intelligence collection and production. CIA has arranged to provide annual production data for certain Soviet industries in support of Air Force targeting studies, thereby obtaining more efficient utilization of community resources in this field of research.

e. With respect to economic intelligence on Free World areas, important shifts in emphasis have occurred. The prolonged crisis in the Middle East, for example, resulted in greatly increased demands on intelligence agencies for research on the economic affairs of that area. As a result of the closing of Suez and the threat to pipelines, additional research was directed to world-wide petroleum problems. Special attention has been given to the economic problems of countries susceptible to Sino-Soviet Bloc economic penetration and to the inter-relations between economic development and political factors in these countries.


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6. Scientific and Technical Intelligence

a. General. There has been continued improvement in scientific intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Our understanding has grown with respect to the quality and quantity of Soviet scientific manpower and developments in specific fields of basic and applied science. As a result, we have greater confidence in our estimates of Soviet technological capabilities. Further significant intelligence was developed on the Soviet atomic energy program, particularly in the fields of thermonuclear weapons development and testing and in the production of fissionable materials. In addition, special studies were prepared on several aspects of the general problem posed by possible international agreement for limitations on nuclear tests.



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Nevertheless much critically-needed information remains unavailable through present collection efforts. In recognition of this continuing problem, an intensified effort has been made to develop and employ new technical means to collect and reduce technological data for use in scientific intelligence estimates. In addition, the Priority National Scientific and Technical Intelligence Objectives were revised during the past year.

b. Capabilities and Trends of Soviet Science and Technology. The first National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 11-6-56) devoted exclusively to this subject was completed during the year. The

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Scientific Estimates Committee, in collaboration with the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee and the Economic Intelligence Committee within their respective spheres, coordinated the basic studies from which the estimate was prepared.

c. Atomic Energy

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during the past year has permitted a reasonably accurate determination of the status and trend of Soviet nuclear weapons developments. This information indicates a concerted effort in thermonuclear weapons development as well as marked progress in weapons design permitting more efficient or economical use of fissionable materials. There was also one nuclear test probably associated with a guided missile firing. No information on the physical characteristics or numbers of USSR nuclear weapons, [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] characteristics of delivery vehicles, or materials production, has become available. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted]

[redacted] double 25X1
our previous figures for the uranium output of East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The start of major uranium mining activity in Hungary (interrupted by the revolution) and an expansion in other Satellites has been noted. The magnitude of the uranium mining effort within the USSR remains an enigma.

[redacted] 25X1
there is still insufficient information to reduce the margins of uncertainty that exist in our estimates of U-235 production. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted]

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an expansion of plutonium production. The location of weapons manufacturing facilities remains unknown as does the allocation of fissionable material among possible weapon types.

Soviet announcements indicate a severe cutback in their originally planned nuclear electric power program for the period 1957-1960, suggesting technical difficulties. Adequate information on plant locations and the progress of their construction is still lacking. Evidence has been received on the construction and characteristics of a nuclear powered icebreaker. We have little evidence on Soviet efforts to apply nuclear propulsion to submarines, aircraft, and missiles although open publications continue to express interest in these developments.

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In summary, we have made significant gains in our atomic energy intelligence, but there remain many critical gaps which require attention to resolve uncertainties about foreign weapons programs, the implications of a nuclear test moratorium, and other important problems.

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d. Guided Missiles

Significant information on the Soviet guided missile program has been obtained in all basic categories during the past year. This data proved valuable in the production of a new national intelligence estimate on the Soviet program. In particular, additional data on developments in the Soviet research and development program contributed to our knowledge of Soviet surface-to-surface guided missiles. Definite associations were also established between the Soviet guided missile and atomic energy programs.

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Although the information received during the past year has increased our general knowledge of the Soviet guided missile program, we still lack specific information regarding the characteristics of missile systems in existence or under development. There is almost a complete lack of evidence on Soviet missile production capabilities and facilities and on operational deployment. Specific evidence is lacking on Soviet military doctrine pertaining to the current and future relationship of guided missiles to a balanced military program.

The intelligence community, recognizing the overriding importance of guided missile intelligence, is continuing energetically both to strengthen the community approach and to stimulate individual action in this field. The Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC), the established interagency mechanism, is increasing its efforts to close existing intelligence gaps. Along these lines, GMIC recently established a subcommittee to coordinate more effectively collection guidance.

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
e. Biological Warfare

The first community-wide estimate (1954) in the field was revised and updated. The current publication estimates the almost certain existence of an active Soviet biological warfare program and assesses Soviet capabilities in offensive and defensive biological warfare. Although progress has been made in BW intelligence through improved analysis of material at hand and through new information, little progress has been made in determining the scope and magnitude of the Soviet BW effort, particularly with respect to offensive biological warfare.

f. Chemical Warfare


An agreed statement of general conclusions on Soviet offensive and defensive chemical warfare capabilities was developed on the working level of the intelligence community. The statement concludes that the USSR has a well-established and capably-staffed CW research and development program but points out wide gaps in our knowledge with respect to the over-all Soviet CW program.

g. Electronics



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A coordinated study on technical characteristics of Sino-Soviet Bloc radars was completed and served as a basis for the first community-wide estimate of their operational capabilities.



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7. Geographic Intelligence

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b. As a consequence of Soviet activities in Antarctica, conducted in association with the International Geophysical Year Program, attention has been directed to the appraisal of advantages that might be gained by the USSR from its Antarctic operations, particularly with respect to its possible territorial aspirations and bipolar geodetic research as an aid to its long-range guided missile program.

C. Collection

1. Priority National Intelligence Objectives

In accordance with NSCID No. 4 the list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives was again revised (DCID 4/6). First Priority Objectives continued to emphasize Sino-Soviet strategy, intentions or plans related to the initiation of hostilities. The highest priority was also assigned to Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack, defense against air (including missiles) attack, and the clandestine delivery of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against the U. S. or key U. S. overseas installations. These priority objectives provide the basic guidance for reappraising collection requirements and planning intelligence production throughout the intelligence community. They have also furnished a stimulus and framework for the development of more refined priority objectives in the economic and scientific and technical fields, as well as in the sphere of international communism.

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2. The Foreign Service

a. The Foreign Service continued to be a major source of overt intelligence information. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the general quality of the reporting remained high, despite increased consumer demands and budgetary limitations which both imposed personnel shortages and restricted the travel and representation funds available. Nevertheless, deficiencies in reporting exist at a few posts. These are occasioned in part by the increasing demands on officers' time arising from official and private visitors and special pressures created by developments such as the Suez or Hungarian crises. The eleven new posts opened during the past year have already increased the amount of information provided to the Department. Of indirect benefit to the over-all foreign intelligence program was the stimulus to greater coordination provided by a Presidential directive to all American Diplomatic Missions. In essence, this directive reiterates the role of the Chief of Mission as the President's personal representative abroad, and vests with him, as the senior American governmental representative, responsibility for supervision and leadership in connection with activities of all U. S. agencies and representatives affecting relations between the U. S. and the country to which he is accredited.

b. The standard of the reporting on the Sino-Soviet Bloc remained high, particularly in the light of the difficulties under which most U. S. missions operated in Moscow and other Soviet Bloc capitals. Reporting officers continued to be handicapped by interference with their travel.

c. Over-all reporting on Sino-Soviet Bloc countries was materially aided by peripheral reporting and information obtained from friendly foreign ministries. Foreign offices or missions of these friendly countries, for example, have provided information to U. S. Embassy officers on political developments in areas such as Albania and Bulgaria.

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d. Trade fair reporting shed considerable light on Sino-Soviet Bloc industrial production. Information obtained from visitors to Sino-Soviet Bloc countries has been a valuable source of economic data.

e. In the Far East, although political reporting on Communist China in general remains a serious problem, reporting on that area from the Consulate General at Hong Kong was especially valuable, particularly the post's excellent analysis of economic and political developments. Gaps in information on North Vietnam and North Korea continue. A limited amount of information on North Vietnam is received from friendly foreign missions or sources in that area. Information received through such exchanges with foreign governments has been valuable.

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3. The Service Attache System

a. The Service Attache System continues to be a major source of intelligence information, particularly military. During the past year certain new collection procedures were developed, especially with respect to travel, and a substantial number of intelligence-gathering opportunities created by crisis situations in various parts of the world were successfully exploited. Additional emphasis was also placed on the selection, training and guidance of attaches.

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b. Severe security restrictions within the Bloc continue to hamper Service Attache collection activities. Nevertheless, valuable intelligence resulted from attache reports from Moscow on order of battle, military equipment, surface-to-air missile sites and other installations.

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Accurate and valuable intelligence was likewise furnished through attache reporting on local crises, such as the fall of the Colombian dictator, Rojas Pinilla.

c. New Naval Attache offices were opened in Tel Aviv and Hamburg, while steps are being taken to open offices in Capetown, reopen the Bucharest office and augment the Naval Attache office in Warsaw. Air Attache activities in the Soviet Bloc and peripheral areas received continuous emphasis, including increases in resources where possible and planning for opening a new office in Rumania. The Army opened a new attache office in Haiti, is preparing to open one in Malaya and has tentatively approved plans for opening offices in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and the Belgian Congo. However, Army Attache staff cuts imposed by the Hungarian government and expulsion

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of a number of Service Attaches from the USSR have already handicapped the operations and, if continued, will further reduce collection capabilities in those countries. Nevertheless, with respect to over-all future capabilities, reviews during the past year have emphasized the importance of the Attache System not only to the Services but to the intelligence community as a whole, and the Department of Defense thus far has continued to maintain generally the personnel strength of the System.

4. Overseas Commands

a. Military overseas commands during the year continued to collect a considerable volume of information on the Sino-Soviet Bloc. United States Army Europe, which provided excellent coverage of Soviet Army activities in East Germany and on Soviet troop movements during the Hungarian Revolution, has also taken steps designed to improve its capabilities for collecting Soviet Bloc scientific and technical information.

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U. S. Air Forces in Europe continued throughout the period to provide good coverage of Soviet air units in East Germany, but has most recently placed primary effort on a coordinated collection action to obtain priority information on the Soviet missile program. This latter effort has achieved considerable initial success and shows promise of producing important intelligence.

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c. Changes in command organization and disposition of forces in the Pacific will result in significant adjustment of intelligence resources and missions in that area. This reorganization will

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
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involve centralization of intelligence responsibilities. An increased emphasis on the Asiatic Mainland and on Southeast Asia is planned.

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7. The Foreign Language Publications Program

The increase in availability of Soviet Bloc publications, previously prohibited for export, has continued. One of the highlights of the period was the increase in military information included in Soviet and Satellite periodicals, with Polish periodicals proving to be a particularly fruitful source of data on Soviet materiel. The Soviets have expanded the publication and release of handbooks containing statistical data on whole segments of their economic development. These handbooks have been translated for the intelligence community. There appears to be a determined effort to release selected Soviet Bloc published source materials on an exchange basis. Scientific and technical open-source foreign literature has proved

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valuable as a source of information for estimating foreign research and development capabilities and reducing the change of technological surprise. In order to insure the proper exploitation of this increased volume for the intelligence community, steps have been taken to augment the work of current facilities through external contractual arrangements. The procurement of foreign language publications has also been made more efficient through an active program of coordination of requirements in Washington and of collection in the field. The exchange-of-publications programs of the several member agencies of the Advisory Committee on Foreign Language Publications were exploited to obtain scarce or otherwise difficult to procure titles. Special reports on the Chinese Communist press in Peking and book publication in Mongolia were submitted As the reporting period closed, a paper was in preparation to evaluate the contribution of foreign publications to intelligence research.

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8. Geographic Intelligence Collection

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b. Acquisition of special subject maps on areas of the Sino-Soviet Bloc has trebled during the past year, and an exchange of nautical charts has been initiated with the USSR. However, practically no topographic maps on these areas have been collected since the end of World War II. Little progress was made during the year in the collection of cartographic and geodetic information on the Sino-Soviet Bloc urgently required for U.S. missile employment and other military purposes.

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9. International Communism

The Committee on International Communism, established by the IAC in January 1956, completed its examination of intelligence production and collection in the field of international communism. It concluded that while both fall far short of the ideal, both are reasonably close to attainable limits at the present time. The Committee has formulated a system of priorities designed to facilitate collection of needed intelligence information. It has also agreed upon a new procedure for the development of coordinated clandestine collection requirements to help fill existing gaps in intelligence on international communism.

10. Programs in Electronics

a. ELINT (Non-Communications Electronic Intercept)

(1) The national structure for the direction and coordination of the ELINT activities of the US established under the provisions of NSCID 17 has grown in stature and capability. The National Technical Processing Center has improved its ability to meet the ELINT processing needs of the intelligence community. A statement of the over-all US ELINT Objectives and General Intelligence Requirements has been developed and approved. Within the framework of these ELINT objectives and through active collaboration with the Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA, a consolidated list of the Specific ELINT Collection Requirements has been developed and promulgated. The Specific Requirements will serve as the basis for the planning, programming, and conduct of all ELINT collection and processing operations.

(2) Improved airborne, shipborne and ground intercept coverage has provided new and significant data on ELINT targets previously inaccessible or unexploited. Information from [] [] ELINT activities [] has improved in quality and quantity and provides valuable data otherwise unavailable to U. S. collection sources. Improved collection

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and analysis techniques have contributed vital information to our knowledge of Soviet missile activity. Information on radar order-of-battle is now also more accurate and complete. It is anticipated that ELINT collection capabilities will continue to improve as more equipment becomes available and new methods of processing and disseminating ELINT are developed.

b. Long-range Radar

The USAF program for exploiting the potential of long-range radar for surveillance of Soviet missile activity [redacted] continues to contribute materially to missile intelligence collection. A long-range radar has recently been installed at Laredo, Texas, for the purpose of monitoring the U.S. missile test firing program and conducting associated research in its intelligence aspects. Modifications are being made to the high-power long-range radars which will increase their effectiveness by extending range of surveillance and accuracy of track data.

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c. Soviet Bloc Jamming of Free World Broadcasts

The Department of Defense has initiated a surveillance and analysis of Soviet Bloc jamming capabilities in the peripheral European area. [redacted]

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11. Foreign Radio and Television Broadcasts

a. During the past year the foreign radio monitoring program continued to provide significant current intelligence information. This proved particularly valuable during the Hungarian and Suez crises.

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b. A field survey explored the suitability of sites for the monitoring of North, East, and West Africa. Consumer requirements for African coverage are currently being weighed to determine whether an African monitoring station should be established within the near future.

c. Television monitoring is expected to increase in importance with the multiplying of foreign stations and the improvement in technical facilities. Experiments are being conducted with recording and photographic equipment for the monitoring of telecasts.

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14. Coordination of Information Processing

The Ad Hoc Committee on Information Processing agreed on standards of quality and procedure for many phases of document handling, and emphasized the importance of compatibility among IAC document systems. Many important projects have been initiated by the intelligence community during the past year in the complex field of document storage, indexing and subject retrieval.

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
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
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Most of these seek the development of film and electronic equipment which will increase processing speeds and assure access to the very large quantities of documents involved. The Committee has made special efforts to advise the IAC agencies on developments in this field.

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D. Coordination

1. Review of National Security Council Intelligence Directives

During the past year the intelligence community took action with respect to various recommendations by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. In this connection, the IAC commenced a comprehensive review of all of the National Security Council Intelligence Directives, and it is anticipated that suggested revisions of these basic directives will be submitted for NSC approval early in FY 1958.

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Annex A

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
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ANNEX A

NSCID'S Relevant to Activities Covered by Annual Report

This annex provides references to those National Security Council Intelligence Directives under which activities covered in the various sections of the report were undertaken or to which they were relevant. A list of NSCID's is attached to this annex for convenient reference.



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List of National Security Council Intelligence Directives

- NSCID-1 Duties and Responsibilities (Revised 28 March 1952)
- NSCID-2 Coordination of Collection Activities Abroad
(Approved 13 January 1948)
- NSCID-3 Coordination of Intelligence Production (Approved
13 January 1948)
- NSCID-4 National Intelligence Objectives (Revised 29 August 1956)
- NSCID-5 Espionage and Counterespionage Operations
(Revised 28 August 1951)
- NSCID-6 Foreign Wireless and Radio Monitoring (Approved
12 December 1947)
- NSCID-7 Domestic Exploitation (Approved 12 February 1948)
- NSCID-8 Biographical Data on Foreign Scientific and
Technological Personalities (Approved 25 May 1948)
- NSCID-9 (Omitted for Security Reasons)
- NSCID-10 Collection of Foreign Scientific and Technological Data
(Approved 18 January 1949)
- NSCID-11 Security of Information on Intelligence Sources and
Methods (Approved 6 January 1950)
- NSCID-12 Avoidance of Publicity Concerning the Intelligence
Agencies of the US Government (Approved 6 January 1950)

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NSCID-15 Coordination and Production of Foreign Economic
Intelligence (Approved 13 June 1951)

NSCID-16 Foreign Language Publications (Approved 7 March 1953)

NSCID-17 Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) (Approved 16 May 1955)

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IAC-D-55/12.2

19 July 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

MEMORANDUM FOR : The Intelligence Advisory Committee
The Chairmen, IAC Subcommittees

SUBJECT : Annual Report to the NSC on the Status
of the Foreign Intelligence Program

REFERENCE : IAC-D-55/12, dated 10 July 1957

1. As foreshadowed in the reference memorandum, we have now received the attached memorandum from the NSC, requesting the usual Annual Report to the NSC. As expected, the memorandum calls for a report along the lines of last year's, but without the material included in last year's Annexes B and C. The scope being thus apparently clear, we do not believe we need any preliminary meeting.

2. In order to meet the 1 September deadline, which is somewhat more generous than we had feared, we propose the following work schedule:

Friday, 2 August: contributions due in IAC Secretariat

Monday, 19 August (approximately): coordination
sessions begin

Submission to IAC preferably on 27 August, possibly
on 3 September

3. Please call the IAC Secretariat if this schedule raises any problems.

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Acting Secretary

Attachment

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Attachment to
IAC-D-55/12.2
19 July 1957

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Washington

July 16, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT : Status of National Security Programs on
June 30, 1957

REFERENCES: A. NSC 5611
B. NSC 5707/8

The President has directed that the departments and agencies responsible for the several national security programs prepare annually reports on the status of those programs for the information of the President and the National Security Council. As requested by the President, these reports should emphasize primarily trends as of the reporting date in comparison with the date of the preceding report (in this case, June 30, 1956) and similar dates in future years so far as they can be reasonably projected. Such trends should be expressed in terms of an integrated appraisal of the status of each program in achieving the objectives set forth in applicable national security policies, particularly NSC 5707/8. This appraisal should take into account not only developments in the U. S. program but also developments elsewhere in the Free World and in the Soviet Bloc which affect the ability of the program to achieve policy objectives. The President has further directed that each status report be as concise as possible consistent with adequate presentation.

Accordingly, it is requested that the Central Intelligence Agency, in consultation with other departments and agencies as may be appropriate, and with the assistance of the NSC Staff, submit not later than September 1, 1957, a report on the status of the foreign intelligence program as of June 30, 1957. The content of this report should follow the general lines of Part 7 of NSC 5611 but should exclude Annexes B and C.

/s/
JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary

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IAC-D-55/12.1
10 July 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director/Plans
Assistant Director/National Estimates
Assistant Director/Current Intelligence
Assistant Director/Research and Reports
Assistant Director/Scientific Intelligence
Assistant Director/Operations
Assistant Director/Central Reference
Assistant Director/Basic Intelligence

SUBJECT : Annual Report to the NSC on the Status
of the Foreign Intelligence Program

REFERENCES : IAC-D-55/11 (Final), 18 August 1956
IAC-D-55/11, 22 June 1956 (with Attachment)

ATTACHMENT : Memorandum for the IAC and Chairmen,
IAC Subcommittees from Secretary, IAC,
10 July 1957

1. Through the attached memorandum we have alerted the IAC agencies and subcommittees to the probable requirement that the intelligence community submit to the NSC by 15 August a report on the status of the foreign intelligence program for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1957. At this time we have no guidance as to the scope and content of this report other than that given in the annexed memorandum.

2. We hope that your office, as a component of CIA, will submit an appropriate contribution to this annual report. However, as was suggested in connection with similar contributions to last year's report, you may find it desirable to utilize any IAC subcommittees under your cognizance in the drafting of such a report so that, if feasible, a consolidated contribution may be submitted. Because of the relatively short time which may be available for completion

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of this report, we believe that you will also wish to initiate action on the preparation of any contributions prior to the receipt of the formal request from the NSC.

3. As soon as it becomes available, we shall furnish you with a copy of the NSC's formal request for further guidance. We shall also advise you as to the timing of any preliminary meeting scheduled to discuss in more detail the procedure to be followed in preparing and coordinating this report.



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JOHN HEIRES
Secretary

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